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Abstract 
We examine generational differences in risk-taking behavior by means of a laboratory 
experiment with monetary incentives. We estimate the parameterized models in the framework of 
cumulative prospect theory and examine the risk aversion, probability weightings and reference 
point adoption of elderly and young groups. The results of our experiment indicate that the elderly 
group is less sensitive to changes in probability and tends to underestimate large probabilities and 
overestimate small probabilities more strongly than does the young group. Furthermore, we find that 
the elderly update their reference point after gains and tend to derive their utility from gains and 
losses not from levels of wealth. In sum, we find that the elderly group’s behavior departs more from 
the traditional expected utility theory than does the young group’s behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), prospect theory has challenged the 
dominant expected utility paradigm to the extent that it has been argued that expected utility theory 
(EUT) should be replaced with prospect theory as the foundation of decision making under risk (e.g., 
Camerer, 1998). There has been a large body of experimental work that supports prospect theory, 
and economic parameters regarding risk aversion, loss aversion, and probability weighting have been 
estimated using such experiments (e.g., Prelec, 1998; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). Some studies, for 
example, Fehr-Duda et al. (2006), have examined gender difference, whereas others, such as 
Humphrey and Verschoor (2004), have examined cross-cultural differences in decision making 
under risk within the framework of prospect theory. Furthermore, a few studies have tested and 
supported prospect theory using real-life datasets (see, for example, Jullien and Salanie (2000), 
which used data from the UK betting market for horse races). 
Surprisingly, however, little work has been done on generational differences in decision making 
under risk, presumably because experimental laboratories normally use students as subjects.1 How 
well older people make economic and risk-taking decisions is an important issue for social policy 
(see Kovalchik et al. (2004), p. 2) because wealth tends to accumulate over people’s lifetimes, and 
therefore, a large portion of wealth is in the hands of older people. The role of this study is to shed 
light on the differences in risk-taking behavior between elderly and young individuals. 
 
1  An exception is Kovalchik et al. (2004). They examined the risk-taking behavior of two 
populations—old and young—along with other types of decisions with a potential for age effects. In 
their studies of risk-taking behavior, subjects were asked to select cards from one of two decks to 
earn cash. The cards were preorganized so that one deck (B) had the more advantageous composition. 
They found that both populations gradually concentrated their choices on deck B. Overall, they 
concluded that the older adults’ decision behavior was similar to that of the young adults. Our 
current study differs from their study in that we explicitly estimate the parameters of risk-taking 
behavior and compare the estimated parameter values between the two populations.  
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We obtain elderly and young individuals’ certainty equivalences for risky lotteries using an 
experiment based on the procedure of Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964), and we estimate the 
parameterized value functions and probability weighting functions for the two groups of subjects: 
old and young.2 In addition to risk aversion and probability weighting, we examine how subjects 
update their reference points during repeated rounds in the experiment. Although the reference point 
plays a prominent role in prospect theory, the manner in which it is updated through time as a 
function of the outcomes of past decisions is unknown. The issue of reference point adoption is also 
important in real-world situations, such as financial markets: it has been argued that the well-
observed disposition effect—the tendency to sell stocks that have gained value too soon and to keep 
stocks that have lost value too long—can be explained by investors’ reference point adoption (see, 
for example, Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2008)). For each group, we estimate and compare the two 
alternative models based on two different assumptions about the reference point adoption. 
The results of our experiment indicate that the old group is risk loving, whereas the young one is 
risk averse, although this difference disappears after controlling for gender. A more robust difference 
was found in probability weighting. We find that the old tend to underestimate large probabilities 
and overestimate small probabilities more than do the young. Furthermore, the model selection test 
indicates that the old tend to update their reference point after gains, whereas the young do not have 
this tendency. In sum, the elderly group’s behavior departs more significantly from the traditional 
EUT than does the young group’s behavior. 
2. The experiment 
The participants were 31 elderly subjects from Silver Jinzai Center (an employment agency for 
elderly people) in Osaka and 32 young employed subjects who were recruited through e-mails and 
fliers. In contrast to the subjects of most existing experimental studies, all our young subjects are 
 
2 We assume that individuals report their true willingness to accept at the BDM although it has been 
an issue and resulted in a large body of work (see Karni and Safra (1989)).  
currently employed. We believe that this composition—retired elderly people and young employed 
people—more realistically represents the population whose financial transactions affect society than 
would be the case if students were used as subjects. The subjects were promised a 5000-yen base 
payment for participation. In addition, they were told that their gains from winning and selling 
lotteries would be added to the 5000-yen participation fee to yield their final payments. Table 1 
shows the characteristics of the two subgroups. It can be seen that the old group consists of a greater 
proportion of males, less-educated individuals, and lower-income earners. 
We used an experiment based on the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) procedure. The 
Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism is widely used to elicit decision makers’ selling prices for 
lotteries. The same procedure was used with our participants in the two groups. Each subject takes 
part in 20 rounds, following five practice rounds. At the beginning of each round, a subject is given a 
ticket for lottery L , which yields 1000 points with probability p  and zero points with probability 
 In each round, the probability  is randomly assigned at the beginning of each round. After 
observing the probability , subjects are asked to announce the minimal price for which they are 
willing to sell the lottery. After the announcement of the selling price, a random offer price is 
selected out of a [1, 1000] segment. If it exceeds the subject’s declared selling price for the lottery, 
he or she has to accept the offer price and receive the monetary payoff of the offer price. If the offer 
price is below his or her selling price, the subject plays the lottery. If the lottery is won, the subject 
receives 1000 points, whereas if the lottery is lost, the subject receives nothing. After 20 rounds are 
played, earned points are exchanged for yen at the rate of 1000 points for 250 yen. 
.1 p− p
p
3. The econometric models 
We invoke the concepts of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) 
and estimate the models based on this theory. The model nests the traditional EUT so that we can 
test the two alternative theories of risk-taking behavior. 
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In our experiment, a two-outcome lottery yields 1000 points with probability  and zero points 
with probability . Let denote the initial wealth of an individual at round i  with . The 
variable  is the accumulation of the past gains by selling or winning lotteries. Then, for our two-
outcome lottery, the outcome when the lottery wins is 
p
p−1 ia 01 =a
ia
1000+ia , whereas when the lottery loses, the 
outcome is . One aspect of CPT is that individuals derive utility from gains and losses relative 
to a reference point, not from total wealth or consumption. Now let denote the reference point and 
let  be the declared selling price at round i . Then, the certainty equivalence  is defined by 
the following equation: 
0+ia
ir
iwta iCE
)0()1000()( 21 iiiii ravravCEv −++−+= ππ , (1) 
where .iiii rwtaaCE −+=  Decision weights are denoted by )2,1( =jjπ , and v  is the value function 
defined on the points. The decision weights depend on the subject’s domain-specific probability 
weighting function . In our two-outcome case, the decision weights can be represented as 
follows: 
)( pw
).(1
)(
2
1
pw
pw
−=
=
π
π
 
We have to choose functional forms for v and  to make the model estimable. One of the 
functional forms most frequently used for the probability weighting function w  is a one-parameter 
version introduced by Quiggin (1982) as well as Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Here, we consider 
the latter version of the probability weighting function:
w
3 
                                                 
3 Other studies such as Lattimore et al. (1992), Prelec (1998), and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) proposed 
two-parameter functional forms that are more flexible and probably more appropriate to use. 
However, we use a one-parameter form because the number of observations is very small when we 
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For the value function, we assume that the valuation of outcomes is represented by the following 
power functional (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992): 
0)(
0
)( <−−
≥=
xx
xxxv β
α
λ . 
As noted in the following, we assume that an individual’s reference point is either zero for each 
round or  for round i . Therefore, we will not have negative outcomes in our 
lottery experiment, and the parameters 
)0( iri ∀= ia )( ii ar =
λ  and β  are not identified. The parameter α  is assumed to 
be greater than zero, and the value function is either concave ( 1<α ), convex ( 1>α ), or linear 
( 1=α ). 
Now, we turn to the reference points. The extension of CPT models to dynamics remains a 
controversial issue. In particular, the manner in which reference points are updated through time as a 
function of the outcomes of past decisions is unknown.4 A natural hypothesis is that the reference 
point adapts in response to past outcomes, shifting upward following a gain and downward 
following a loss. To reflect this hypothesis, we first assume that the reference point is updated 
following gain in each round so that 
ir
ii ar = . Then, equation (1) is rewritten as follows: 
)1000()(
)0()1000()( 21
vpw
vCEv
i
i
=
+= ππ
, 
                                                                                                                                               
estimate the likelihood function for each individual below and, in such a case, it is preferable that the 
number of parameters to be estimated be small.  
4 However, recent research such as Arkes et al. (2006) has examined this issue and found the 
asymmetric adaptation of gains and losses. 
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where iiiii wtaawtaaCE =−+= . Note that, under this assumption, the individual derives his utility 
from gain from the lottery not from the outcome level. We refer to this model as Model 1. Next, we 
consider the case in which a reference point is not adopted at all: 01 == ari  for all i . In this case, 
equation (1) is rewritten as follows: 
)())(1()1000()(
)0()1000()( 21
iiii
iii
avpwavpw
aavCEv
−++=
+++= ππ
, 
where iiiii wtaawtaaCE +=−+= 0 . We refer to this model as Model 2. Note that under these 
functional forms of the value function and the probability weighting function, Model 2 nests the 
EUT. Under this model, the individual is assumed to value the final asset level, and when γ = 1, there 
is no probability weighting, as in EUT. Therefore, EUT is addressed as a special case of Model 2. 
We estimate Model 1 and Model 2 and compare which model performs better for the of old and 
young. The two models are polar cases, in the sense that one assumes complete reference point 
adoption whereas the other assumes no such adoption occurs. In reality, of course, individuals may 
perform somewhere between these two polar cases. Therefore, in order to compare the two models, 
we conduct the likelihood ratio test of Vuong (1989), which does not require us to assume that one 
of the two models is correctly specified. The Vuong test assumes that both of the competing 
nonnested models are incorrect and compares their distance from the correct specification. Therefore, 
we can obtain the information that reveals which model is closer to the true model. 
Finally, our empirical models for Model 1 and Model 2 are specified as follows: 
Model 1: , iii vpwvwta ε+= − )]1000()([1
Model 2: , iiiiiii avpwavpwvawta )]())(1()1000()([ ε+−++=+ −1
where we assume that ),0(~ σε Ni . We estimate parameters σγα ,,  by maximum likelihood 
estimation. 
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4. The results 
First, we estimate Model 1 and Model 2 using the entire sample, and the two groups: old and 
young. Table 2 shows the results. It can be seen that the estimated values are very similar between 
the two models (for the same sample). The results of estimated α  suggest that, on average, elderly 
individuals are risk loving whereas young individuals are risk averse. The value of γ  for the old 
group is estimated to be significantly lower than that for the young group, implying that elderly 
individuals are less sensitive to the change in probability.  Figure 1 presents the probability 
weighting functions for the old and young groups using the estimated values of γ . They imply that 
the old tend to overestimate small probabilities and underestimate large probabilities more strongly 
than do the young. 
Table 3 shows the results from the Vuong tests. The results show that Model 1 is preferred for the 
estimations using the entire sample and the old sample, at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. It 
seems that old individuals tend to update their reference points in each period. For the young sample, 
neither of the alternative models is preferred. However, the likelihood ratio is higher for Model 2, 
and hence, other model selection tests such as Akaike information criteria would choose Model 2 for 
the young sample. Our selection tests indicate that the old and the young are different in their 
methods of reference point adoption. Elderly individuals tend to update their reference points every 
time after gains and, therefore, tend not to take their initial wealth a into account in their risk-taking 
behavior. Their utility is derived from gains from the lotteries not from the outcome levels. Realizing 
that Model 2 is identical to EUT when γ  is one, our results, which indicate a lower γ  and a better 
fit of Model 1 for the old, imply that the behavior of the elderly departs more significantly from 
traditional EUT than does that of the young. 
Because the characteristics of our two groups differ significantly, as shown in Table 1, the above 
results indicating behavioral differences between the two groups may merely be a reflection of the 
differences in the each group’s characteristics. In order to control for these characteristics, we 
conduct the same estimation for each individual and obtain the same parameter values for each 
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individual. Then, we regress these parameters on their characteristics, including age, and determine 
whether age has significant effects on the parameter values. We conduct a Vuong test for each 
individual and use the parameter values from the selected model for the regression. When the Vuong 
test does not prefer either model, we use the one that has a higher likelihood. 
Table 4 presents the results from estimations for 23 elderly individuals and 32 young 
individuals.5 We show the average and median values for each parameter. The results continue to 
indicate that elderly individuals have a higher α  and a lowerγ . Table 5 presents the results from the 
regressions on α  andγ . Here, we use age, education, income, a male dummy, and a constant for 
control variables.6 The results show that once the other characteristics are controlled for, age does 
not have a significant effect onα . However, age still has a significant effect on γ , and older 
individuals have a lowerγ , implying that older individuals tend to have more distorted probability 
weighting functions. In addition, the results show that more highly educated individuals are more 
risk averse, whereas male individuals are less risk averse at a significant level. Furthermore, we 
found that more highly educated individuals have less-distorted probability weighting functions, 
which is intuitive. In addition, individuals with higher incomes have less-distorted probability 
weighing functions. 
5. Conclusion 
Our experimental study demonstrates that generational differences in risk-taking behavior 
crucially depend on probability weights and reference point adoption. We found that elderly 
individuals are less sensitive to the probability change. In addition, we found that elderly individuals 
                                                 
5 There are some elderly individuals who obviously do not behave nonstrategically, and whose 
parameter values are extremely unrealistic. For example, some individuals always hit the same 
number for 20 rounds. We excluded these elderly samples from our further estimation.  
6 The education variable in Table 1 is converted to the actual number of years of education. For the 
income and age variables in Table 1, the median value in each category is used. 
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tend to update their reference points after gains and do not derive utility from total level of wealth. 
That is, elderly individuals seem to depart more significantly from traditional EUT. As most 
developed countries face aging populations and the main wealth holders are elderly individuals, such 
behavioral differences should be taken into account where social policy is concerned. 
We have estimated only one specification of CPT. The next step should be to consider more 
flexible functional forms, including weighting functions with two parameters and semiparametric 
forms. Furthermore, the current study cannot identify the degree of loss aversion. Although we do 
not find any difference in risk aversion between the two generations, elderly individuals may exhibit 
higher loss aversion, and such behavioral differences will have important policy implications. 
Therefore, our next direction is to consider an experimental design that would enable us to determine 
the degree of loss aversion. 
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Table 1 Characteristics of the entire sample, old and young subsamples (percentages) 
  All Old Young 
Sex Male 63.49 74.19 53.13 
 Female 36.51 25.81 46.88 
Age      
 20s 7.94 0.00 15.63 
 30s 7.94 0.00 15.63 
 40s 22.22 0.00 43.75 
 50s 11.11 0.00 21.88 
 60s 34.92 67.74 3.13 
 70s 11.11 22.58 0.00 
 Unknown 4.76 9.68 0.00 
Education     
 Elementary school – Junior high 3.17 6.45 0.00 
 – High school 30.16 58.06 3.13 
 – Polytechnic 1.59 0.00 3.13 
 – Junior college 9.52 6.45 12.5 
 – University (non science) 42.86 19.35 65.63 
 – University (science) 9.52 9.68 9.38 
 – Graduate school 3.17 0.00 6.25 
Income     
 No income 12.7 19.35 6.25 
 Less than 1 million yen 3.17 3.23 3.13 
 1–2 million yen 11.11 9.68 12.5 
 2–4 million yen 19.05 25.81 12.5 
 4–6 million yen 11.11 16.13 6.25 
 6–8 million yen 1.59 0.00 3.13 
 8–10 million yen 12.7 0.00 25 
 10–12 million yen 4.76 0.00 9.38 
 12–14 million yen 3.17 0.00 6.25 
 More than 14 million yen  1.59 0.00 3.13 
 Unknown 19.05 25.81 12.5 
 
Table 2 Estimation results for Models 1 and 2 
 Model 1 
(full adoption of reference point) 
Model 2 
(no reference point adoption) 
 All Old Young All Old Young 
α  1.0842*** 1.3643*** 0.9520* 1.0843*** 1.3642*** 0.9517* 
 (0.1257) (0.0333) (0.5483) (0.1257) (0.0333) (0.5491) 
γ  0.5267*** 0.3922 0.6766*** 0.5268*** 0.3925*** 0.6765***
 (0.0569) (0.0681) (0.1077) (0.0569) (0.0681) (0.1077) 
σ  239.4308*** 232.3844*** 229.4452*** 239.4317*** 232.3892*** 229.4450***
 (45.8356) (52.7820) (52.7524) (45.8382) (52.7849) (52.7530) 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 Vuong test of Model 1 against Model 2 
 Vuong statistics Model 1 vs. Model 2 
All 1.81* 
Old 2.50** 
Young –0.60 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4 Individual estimation results 
 All Old Young 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
α  1.3573 1.0099 1.8646 1.1142 1.0085 0.9777 
γ  0.6614 0.6828 0.5418 0.5167 0.7437 0.7576 
σ  135.7924 112.6086 108.9852 89.5142 154.2223 126.9430 
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Table 5 Regression results for α  and γ  
 α  γ
Age 0.0002 –0.0031*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0007) 
Education –0.0893*** 0.0422*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0050) 
Income 0.0001* 0.0001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Male 0.3737*** –0.0348* 
 (0.0703) (0.0201) 
Constant 2.1605*** 0.1985*** 
 (0.3387) (0.0968) 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1: Estimated probability weighting functions of the old and the young. 
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